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2ABSTRACT
Although the Behavioral Theory of the Firm has served as continuing stimulus in diverse
field of inquiry such as organizational learning, the theory of the firm, and decision making
research more generally and there is good reason to expect that this influence continues to
remain significant, the reach of the theory as it stands in situation of genuine uncertainty
remains limited. This paper seeks to address this gap by taking steps towards extending the
theory of search. A key departure from earlier approaches to the theory of search is the
inclusion of the question “How do aspiration levels come about?” in addition to the received
question “How do aspiration levels change.” This approach highlights the significance of an
extended model of search in situations of Knightian uncertainty and Shacklian surprise. For
instance, the concept of dynamic search sheds light on the role of 1) experimentation and
play in the creation of aspirations, 2) creating disbelief in situations of lacking prior
experience, and 3) disengaging limits of imagination. This paper develops aspects of the
theoretical foundations of the concept of dynamic search and clarifies processes leading to
new aspirations that guide subsequently firm adaptation. While many implications of
dynamic search are still unexplored, building on insights from specifically the economists
Shackle, Knight and the recent work of March and more generally from the ‘bounded
rationality’ - tradition appears to be a promising avenue for new advances in organization
science.
31. Introduction
The behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963) has been among the most
inspiring fields in economics and management research. Although is has served as
continuing stimulus in diverse field of inquiry such as organizational learning, the theory of
the firm, and decision making research more generally and there is good reason to expect
that this influence continues to remain significant, the reach of the theory as it stands in
situation of genuine uncertainty remains limited. Yet, many companies (e.g. biotech,
software, high-tech engineering, media) find themselves in competitive situations signified
by hyper-competition (D’Aveni, 1994), high velocity environments (Eisenhardt, 1997), or
rugged landscapes (Kauffmann, 1995; Levinthal, 1997). Such situation have been variously
described by high degrees of creative destruction, competing technological trajectories, low
general agreement among potential players on standards, fast shifting alliances, and
changing network formations across traditional industry boundaries. These environmental
conditions result in a high degree of managerial ignorance and uncertainty, competitive
surprise, as well as indeterminate and non-probabilistic future outcomes in the evolutionary
development of competitive spaces.
These conditions pose a challenge for the firm’s adaptation and survival in that such
situation are signified by a lack of relevant prior experience, confusion, lack of orientation,
and consequently a lack of clear aspiration that could guide adaptive firm behavior. As a
departure from earlier approaches to the concept of search within the behavioral theory of
the firm in which the existence of aspiration levels is assumed, the concept of dynamic
search advocates the inclusion of the question “How do aspiration levels come about?” in
addition to the received question “How do aspiration levels change.” While the argument of
the paper takes its departure from the tenets of the "Behavioral Theory of the Firm" (Cyert
& March, 1963) and shares the concern with economic processes under conditions of
bounded rationality, imperfect environmental matching and adaptation, it is specifically
interested in complications a sociated with search in situations of genuine uncertainty.
4This paper supports the recent call of Radner (1996) who suggests to refocus attention on
“bounded rationality” as the crux for the theory of organization and recommends future
research on the notion of “truly bounded rationality” as a step towards incorporating
genuine uncertainty in explaining organizational adaptation. This kind of uncertainty does
not only concern environmental complexity, but additionally and equally important
endogenous-subjective factors, such as divergent judgment, time perception, and lack of
prior experience. Therefore, this paper asks: what are the implications for organizational
adaptation, search, and aspirations in organizations taking this kind of uncertainty literally?
We suggest to reconsider the notion of bounded rationality by extending it beyond the
aspect of limited computational human capacity toward limited imagination in situation of
genuine uncertainty.
While most literature has tended to focus on environmental complexity that, given the
limitations of the agents cognitive competence in coping with this complexity, leads to
uncertainty (e.g. Thompson, 1967; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), the concept of dynamic
search incorporates additionally the endogeneity of preferences (March, 1994) and the
endogeneity of ignorance (Loasby, 1976) as crucial to genuine uncertainty. We address
implications for a theory of search in situations of lacking prior experience and lacking
initial aspiration-levels which could guide the firm’s adaptation. Moreover, stressing
dynamic search suggests to ask: When genuine uncertainty requires judgment and human
problem solving needs prior problem-finding, while simultaneously there is a lack of prior
experience, what processes, then, lead to new spirations?
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two discusses the foundation of
the concept of dynamic search and presents a concept definition. Section three suggests
processes associated with dynamic search. This facilitates the investigation of a variety of
problems associated with dynamic search such as prior knowledge, ignorance, and the
subjectivity of real-time in multi-person setting. In section four, we summarize the paper
and conclude with implications for promising areas of future research.
2. Dynamic Search I: Foundation
5The concept of dynamic search builds on three previously largely unrelated but
complementary useful streams of literature. First, we briefly summarize the theory of search
in the behavioral theory of the firm as a point of departure. This theory is acknowledged as
an antecedence to the concept of dynamic search. Secondly, we clarify with Knight (1921)
and Shackle (1961, 1966, 1979) the notion of genuine uncertainty and distinguish it from
risk. Thirdly, we discuss situations of genuine uncertainty in relation to surprise and
imagination to provide the foundation of the concept of dynamic search. Finally, we suggest
a working definition for dynamic search.
2.1 Antecedence: Search and Adaptation in the Behavioral Theory of the Firm
The behavioral theory of the firm suggests to conceptualize the firm as adaptive political
coalition (March, 1962; Cyert & March, 1963); a coalition between different individuals and
groups of individuals in the firm each having different goals and hence, there is the
possibility of conflicting interests. Centrally, the firm is seen as an adaptive system which,
through learning and experimentation, adapts to its environment. The experience of the firm
is embodied in a number of “standard operating procedures”; procedures for solutions to
problems, which the firm in the past has managed to solve. As time pass by and experience
change, so do standard operating procedures through processes of organizational search
and learning. The firm is, in other words, not a static entity – it is a dynamic system of rules,
where search is triggered and driven by present levels of aspiration in conjunction with
deviations of actual outcomes from that aspirations.1 In particular, two aspects of the
behavioral theory of the firm are of importance for an understanding of the firm’s
adaptation: (1) the recognition that humans are boundedly rational, and (2) the theory of
search.
2.1.1 Aspirations and Search
                                                 
1 This view of the firm is, of course, different from other modern theories of the firm (such as transaction
cost theory or evolutionary theory). However, there are also a number of important similarities: The concept
of bounded rationality is now standard in the transaction cost theory of especially Oliver Williamson (e.g.
1985); elements of the thoughts of the firm as an adaptive political coalition can be found in game-
theoretical theories of teams (Marschak & Radner, 1972); conflict of interest is most commonly assumed in
transaction cost theory, and the view of the firm as being a system of rules which adapt to its changing
environment is, of course, important in the evolutionary theory put forward by especially Richard Nelson
and Sidney Winter (1982).
6Central to the firm’s adaptation are processes of search that revolve around aspiration
levels. Aspiration levels serve the function of guiding agents with only limited cognitive
capacity towards action in representing the imagined potential gains and losses, and
constituting what motivates action and decisions. That is, aspiration levels are strongly
influenced by the past and by comparisons between present and past. Thus,
“[t]he history is important because aspiration levels – the dividing line between good
enough and not good enough – are not stable. In particular, individuals adapt their
aspirations … to their experience. Studies of aspiration level adjustment in situations in
which information on the performance of others is lacking indicate that decision makers
revise aspirations in the direction of best performance but retain a bit more optimism than is
justified by that experience. Thus, current aspirations can be approximated by a positive
constant plus an exponentially weighted moving average of past experience. … [However]
[t]he world is more complicated than … a simple model would suggest, of course.
Aspirations adapt not only to one’s own experience but also to the experience of others.
They can become attached not just to the level or reward but to the rate of change of
reward. They do not adapt instantaneously, and they appear to adapt upward more rapidly
than downward. As a result, deviations in a negative direction seem to be more persistently
noticed than positive deviations. This “predisposition to dissatisfaction” is, of course, a
strong stimulus for search and change in situations where it exists” (March, 1994:22-3).
Aspiration levels are not fixed, but change with the uniqueness of particular decision makers
and the experience of those who are involved in processes of firm adaptation. By stressing
the differences, and indeed the tension, between the actual level of aspiration and outcome
achieved, firms are able to motivate themselves towards particular aspirations. In other
words: decision making requires a longing towards that aspiration, though it might never be
reached. Furthermore, it is important to note that it is not satisfaction per se which move
people to act; dissatisfaction does: “[H]igh satisfaction, per se, is not a particularly good
predictor of high production nor does it facilitate production in a causal sense. Motivation
to produce stems from a present or anticipated state of discontent” (March & Simon, 1958:
71).
While the received behavioral theory of search stresses the role of how aspiration levels
change in the firm’s adaptation it does not directly explain the origin of aspiration levels;
7they are already in existence, and may then change in response to various internal and
external events and dynamics. Moreover, although it is important to recognize the role of
prior experience in changing aspirations, we are interested in situations where prior
experience are lacking (e.g. ignorance) among those who make decisions relevant to the
firm’s adaptation. Equally interesting is the question how prior knowledge limits
imagination. In order to see what explains the origin of new (and not only modified)
aspirations we need a perspective which stresses the imaginative abilities and its limits in
adaptive processes.
2.1.2 The bounds of rationality
The theory of rational choice and an associated focus on maximizing expected utility has
indeed been dominating the economics profession for long. By contrast, the behavioralist
literature (e.g. March, 1978; Simon, 1955,1956; Simon 1976) explicitly calls into attention
(a) the boundaries of rationality which make human cognition imperfect, and (b) their
implications for organizational adaptation. To Simon (1956), one reason why rationality is
bounded is limited cognitive capacity of humans when facing complexity. A complex
system, Simon argues, is “one made up of large number of parts that interact in a nonsimple
way. In such systems, the whole is more than the sum of the parts, not in an ultimate
metaphysical sense, but in the important pragmatic sense that, given the properties of the
parts and the laws of the interaction, it is not a trivial matter to infer the properties of the
whole. In the fact of complexity, in in-principle reductionist may be at the same time a
pragmatic holist” (1962:468). It is because of this complexity, that decision makers will
experience the limits of their cognitive and informational processing capabilities. To cope
rationality with complexity while at the same time conserving on the mental resources,
decision makers take resort to rules and standard operating procedures. The concept of
bounded rationality, thus, captures the idea that the limitations of human decision makers
should be added to the host of other technical limits decision-making faces. March
(1978:590) explains: “It started from the proposition that all intendedly rational behavior is
behavior within constraints. Simon added the idea that the list of technical constraints on
choice should include some properties of human beings as processors of information and as
problem solvers. The limitations were limitations of computational capability, the
organization and utilization of memory, and the like. He suggested that human beings
8develop decision procedures that are sensible, given the constraints, even though they might
not be sensible if the constraints were removed. As a short-hand label for such procedures,
he coined the term ‘satisficing’ ” In contrast to maximizing, the notion of satisfacing
recognizes that decision making under conditions of bounded rationality is driven by the
search for alternatives that are good enough (measured against some existing aspirations)
rather that optimal.
Although bounded rationality is the central assumption of the behavioural theory of the firm,
its usage in the conceptualization of search remains largely focused on limited
computational capacity. As much as it is important to recognize the impact of limited
computational capacity of humans, the notion of bounded rationality remains one of
bounded applicability if reduced to this aspect alone - and this is especially true in situations
of genuine uncertainty. The reduced notion of bounded rationality is essentially not able to
capture situations of ‘truly bounded rationality’ (Radner, 1996); situations where dynamic
search becomes important, where new aspirations need to be created from scratch rather
than old ones changed and modified. By focusing on the difficulties in finding the suitable
solution within complex, but already existing systems, the boundaries of rationality are
merely ‘reflections of people’s computational ability’ (cf. Langlois, 1997:12; 1990, Loasby,
1989).
But there is more than that to the notion of bounded rationality. Simon (1976) has early
asserted that if future consequences of present decisions are known in a fragmentary manner
only, ‘imagination’ must supply the ‘lack of experienced feeling’ in attaching value to them
(p.81). More importantly here is that in the received theory of search, genuine uncertainty is
hardly embodied – not least because no genuinely new aspirations and targets can logically
occur within a system which is per definition pre-existing. In order to address situations of
genuine uncertainty and to introduce ‘dynamic search’, that is the process through which
new aspirations are created, we need to expand the concept of ‘bounded rationality’ to
move it beyond the aspect of limited ability to compute in the face of complexity by
incorporating limited imagination. To address this question we draw on inspirations from
the economists, George Shackle (1961,1979) and Frank Knight (1921). In section three we
shall address the process of dynamic search.
92.2 Uncertainty, Surprise and Imagination
Surprise and imagination play important roles in the firm’s adaptation under conditions of
genuine uncertainty; situations where problems need to be identified, structured, imagined,
before new aspirations takes shape. In a world of rational choice, by contrast, there is no
room for surprise and imagination: “Rational choice, choice which can demonstrate its own
attainment of maximum objectively possible advantage, must be fully informed choice….
The paradox of rationality is that it must concern itself with choosing amongst things fully
known; but in the world of time, only this is fully known which is already beyond the reach
of choice, having already become actual and thus knowable. Rational choice, it seems, must
be confined to timeless matters” (Shackle, 1972: 245-6). But theoretician have, as Shackle
rightly asserts, a ‘stark choice’: “[sh]e can reject either time or rationality” (1972:xi). If we
claim unbounded rationality there will be no room for temporality and for duration. On the
other hand, if we allow temporality and duration, there is no ground for claiming
‘unbounded rationality’ (cf. Langlois, 1984).
Uncertainty, imagination and surprise are real-time phenomena2. Leaving the Newtonian
concept of time and the assumption of time-reversibility aside, time is seen here as
something “whose essence and also whose existence involves its continuous movement and
continuous evolution” (1958:14). Real-time connects the past to the present through
experience, memory and expectations of individuals in time (O’Driscoll and Rizzo, 1985,
chapter IV). ‘Moments’ become a connecting passage between past and future, the duration
of which is subjectively contained (Shackle, 1958). Shackle argues that “each of us has in
the very act of living, the time in which we sense, perceive, feel, think, imagine, and decide.
From this inside view, the time of our actual psychic experience is but a moment, utterly
solitary in its isolation from all other moments. It is what I would like to call the solitary
present or the moment in being” (1959:285).
In this process perspective, perceiving time is not only irreversible, it is subjective and
context bound and translates in conjunction with other subjectively perceived features of
                                                 
2 Shackle was very close to the French philosopher, Henri B rgson, in his view on time and his insistence
on the continuity of always incomplete and heterogeneous “duration”. The idea that the ceaseless emergence
of psychological events constitute “true” time is of course a violation of the Newtonian concept of time as
being analogue to space filled up with events (Cap k, 1971:91).
10
reality into different individual judgment. For example, decision makers taking part in the
firm’s adaptation may judge issue-urgency, hastiness of action, slow motion, or hesitating
behavior of other decision makers differently from their own judgment. Although decision-
makers involved in the firm’s adaptation live in the same moment of time, individual
perception of duration of that moment is subjective and thus differs. This carries serious
implications for our understanding of processes of search in the firm’s adaptation. As soon
as we allow ‘real-time’ to pass, bounded rationality in a theory of search requires the
consideration of bounded imagination which may restrict the creation of, or worse still,
completely prevents new aspirations in situations of genuine uncertainty.
2.2.1 Risk, Uncertainty and Genuine Uncertainty3
Uncertainty can be distinguished from risk (Knight, 1921)4. To Shackle (1966) uncertainty
obtains when “the possible consequences of an act are not listable” (p. 75) and to Knight
(1921) uncertainty denotes situations where there is ‘no basis of any kind for classifying
instances objectively.’ Distinctly, risk denotes situation where such a basis exists, instances
are classified, and estimated value may be attached to that instances. Risk refers to
repetitious events, and it is assumed that the decision makers are able to list outcomes to
relevant choices and estimate the corresponding probability distribution. By contrast
uncertainty, cannot “by any method be reduced to an objective, qualitatively determined
probability” (Knight, 1921:231). To Knight (1921) and to Shackle uncertainty arises in
cases of unique events. For example, when “[b]usiness decisions deal with situations which
are far too unique … for any sort of statistical tabulations to have any value.” (Ibid:232)
In the case of uncertainty, it is important to classify particular instances in the first place -
for unless instances are themselves estimated no value can be attached. Genuine uncertainty,
in a Shacklian sense, goes further than both, risk and uncertainty. It includes additionally the
recognition that the future contains no states, no facts, nor events which are there to be
                                                 
3 Though not referring to either Shackle or Knight, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky in a similar spirit
talk about ‘variants of uncertainty’ and the role of expectation and surprise on discussing expectancies
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). They stress what they term ‘perceptual uncertainty’ which is aimed to
incapsulate the element of surprise in perception and thus, relies more on beliefs than on action.
4 Compare Mises (1949) for a similar distinction between ‘case’ and ‘class’ probability.
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classified;. hence there the unlistability problem. Instead, genuine uncertainty requires
processes of dynamic search which lead to the imagination and creation of such states, facts
and events based on experimental judgment and choices in the present. Here action-
outcome frameworks do not exist ex-ante, they are imagined and created.
To both Knight (1921) and Shackle (1972: 96) uncertain situation require conjectural
judgment, and “choice does not consist in comparing the items in a list, known to be
complete, of given fully specified rival and certainly attainable results. It consists in first
creating, by conjecture and reasoned imagination on the basis of mere suggestions
offered…, the things on which hope can be fixed.” Moreover, under uncertainty, prior
knowledge (e.g. experience embodied in routines or individual expertise) may give no
reason to believe certain futures to happen – but it might give reasons to disbelieve that
particular futures happen. For example, decision makers in a newspaper firm might not
know the impact of internet business on its traditional business, but although they
reasonably assume that internet business will not leave traditional business untouched, its
impact and responding moves remain unimagined. Moreover, when prior knowledge is a
limited guide for adaptation and genuine uncertainty prevails, the question becomes relevant
how to understand the bounds of imagination and the limitations of what is ‘deemed
possible’ (Shackle, 1979) in the creation of new aspirations.
2.2.2 Surprise and Disbelief
A useful starting point in this respect is the notion of ‘potential surprise’ (Shackle, 1961,
1966). To illustrate, suppose “that a little distance from me in a tube train I see an English
friend reading a book with easy enjoyment. I cannot see the title of the book. I shall not be
in the least surprised if the book turns out to be in English or French, and only a little
surprised if it turns out to be in German. I shall be more surprised if the book … be in
Italian or Spanish, still more surprised if it is in Dutch, and astonished if it is in Welsh. As to
the possibility of its being a manuscript in my own handwriting, which I am conscious of
having locked away in my desk a few minutes earlier, I feel able to exclude that hypothesis
completely; should it prove true, the intensity of my surprise would be as great as I am
capable of feeling.” (Shackle, 1966:31).
12
For an extended understanding of dynamic search in situations of genuine uncertainty three
things merit consideration: First, potential surprise is a function of disbelief in a particular
event.5 Secondly, potential surprise requires prior imagination, for unimagined events
prevent to attach disbelief in any sense. Moreover, absent imagination, complete ignorance
prevails and lethal surprise may set an end to the firm’s adaptation. Finally, we expect that
potential surprise provides occasion for experimental learning. If true, one can conjecture
that dynamic search involves processes that engage the creation of disbelief. Furthermore,
when potential surprise based on prior imagination allows for experimental learning, the
creation of new aspirations depends not only on the creation, but also on the negotiation of
degrees of disbelief because the extent of disbelief will differ among those involved in the
firm’s adaptation. It is through negotiation among individuals that “degrees of disbelief” and
associated occasions for collective learning are created.
So far we have highlighted the role of potential surprise. Crucially potential surprise
depends on prior imagination, but what limits imagination and what is ‘deemed possible’?
and how do decision makers dis-engage with such limits in the process of dynamic search -
at least partially?
2.2.3 Imagination and its Bounds
In the first place, choice in situations of genuine uncertainty depends not on probabilities of
expected outcomes, but more upon imagination of possibilities. Imagination is directed to
the future and to the past. Thus it concerns choices among imagined experiences (Shackle,
1964: 12), whereby the past is employed to imagine the future. Imagination, in turn, is
                                                 
5 In particular, Shackle suggests: "Disbelief is an intellection, something which has, in itself, form rather
than intensity. What psychic experience can we find, that will reflect these forms as intensities? There is
one emotion which directly springs from the combination of some formal kind or source of disbelief, and an
actual taking-place which beliefs that disbelief. This is the feeling of surprise. The individual may be
supposed to ask himself: How much or little should I be surprised if, with no relevant change in my present
knowledge, such-and-such occurred? Potential surprise seems to me a practical link between formal and
emotional disbelief" (Shackle, 1983:34).
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constrained by what decision makers deem possible (Shackle, 1961,1979). By imagination
we mean here the individual and/or collective formation of ideas, emotions and belief in
future things, facts, states, and realities. These have not been experienced before, but
courses of action which lead to their creation are deemed possible (whether or not this turns
later out to be the case). Clearly, imagination involves emotions of confidence despite
adversity and though beyond past experience. Both are important, for emotions without
thoughts are blind and thoughts without emotions are impotent. “In order to imagine
sequels to…a present choice, in order thus to experience an anticipate enjoyment (salutary
through its possible inducement of action), or an anticipative apprehension (salutary through
its warning against exposure to disaster) the chooser needs an alphabet and a language with
which to give form to the possible sequels of a choice. This elements must, then, have in
some sense an emotive content or at least an emotive capacity or potential" (Shackle,
1979:22).
While imagination is triggered through perceived genuine uncertainty, it is also limited in
important ways. There are “degrees in which imagination can be constrained. With total
absence of constraint it is mere fiction, fantasy, or daydream, ... to play its part in decision,
imagination must be constrained to be congruous with what the decision maker knows of
the nature of things in general ... Decision is an operation of an individual mind, and for
such decision only those things count which belong to that mind, which are available to it
and are sanctioned by it. For us, in attempting to analyze decision, possibility means the
absence of fatal obstacles within the decision maker’s knowledge; it means possibility, of
some degree, registered and admitted by him" (Shackle, 1961:11-12). Note that imagination
is not only contrained by ignorance, that is, what decision makers do not know. But it is
also contrained by prior knowledge of decision makers; that is, what decision makers take
to be the case. Additionally, imagination must recognize experienced grounds: “There must
be some grounds for choosing, but they must be inadequate” (Loasby, 1976:5).6 While
thought and emotions in imagination cannot lay their hands on the complex interplay of the
decision ground’s constituencies in its totality, they can actively dispense with its particular
rigidities through the creation of disbelieve; they help bracketing conclusion while choosing.
                                                 
6 See Augier (1998) for an extended discussion on Shackle and the paradox of choice.
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Consequently, in situations of genuine uncertainty, imagination involves the recognition of
ignorance, the inadequacy of prior grounds for choosing, and the plasticity of the past. The
past is experienced, but memory is more than recall and repetition of though. It is active
reconstruction. The future is undetermined. It is also unpredictably brought about through
intentional action. It is thus an essential feature of imagination that the bounds of what is
imagined to happen in the future are subject to judgment based on beliefs and interpretation
of what has happened in the past. Once these beliefs and interpretations are recognized as
conjecture rather than ethereal truth, the past may be retold, the burden experience places
on imagination may diminish, and the choice to dispense with what has been thought to be
known creates space for the novel.7 It is in this sense that ‘deemed possibility’ is judgment
(Shackle, 1979) and processes of dynamic search gain momentum.
This section has argued that dynamic search is especially relevant in situations of genuine
uncertainty, and that dynamic search involves surprise, imagination and disbelief. We are
now in the position to define dynamic search and to examine sub-processes of dynamic
search in greater depth.
3. Dynamic Search II: Processes and Activities
Dynamic search is defined as the process through which in situations of genuine
uncertainty, with the help of experimental judgment, imagination, and active disbelief, new
aspirations are created. Here we examine three sub-processes related to the concept of
dynamic search. These include experimentation and play, creation of disbelief, and
                                                 
7 Note that we do not argue that imagination requires unlearning (Hedberg, 1981). The past is not
eradicated, deleted, or needs to be forgotten for imagination to happen. Instead, it is actively dealt with and
its conclusions are rearranged to imagine the future by dispensing belief in its determinate consequences
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disengaging limitations of imagination. The discussion sheds light on the question how
aspiration levels come about?
3.1 The Role of Experimentation and Play in the Creation of Aspirations
In seems clear in the context of genuine uncertainty that new aspirations requires not merely
combining existing ideas/technologies/knowledge, but also an element of imagination
(Shackle, 1979; March, 1994). To March (1994) motivation and decision making is linked
to the fact that people make sense of the information (cf. Weick, 1995), on which they base
their decisions. In speaking of ‘decision engineering’ he stresses that because of the
uncertainty and complexity involved, “the links between processes and outcomes cannot be
assumed” (March, 1994:224). However, we may make sense of the decisions by its
‘intelligence’8: “The intelligence of an action is defined in terms of its outcomes. An action
is defined as intelligent if, after all the results are in (including possible changes in
preferences and identities), it has satisfied the wishes of relevant parties” (Ibid: 224).
Obviously, output-intelligence, if it ever can be reached, is not only hard to accomplish, but
provides little guidance in situations were aspirations are lacking in the first place and these
are needed to guide the firm’s subsequent adaptation.
More importantly, March (1994) argues, although choice involves experimental activity, it
may not be limited to search guided by existing aspirations. Experimental choices may
additionally concern the creation and discovery of new aspirations through playfulness
(March, 1971, 1994, chapter6) and experimental judgment. In particular, ‘playfulness’
involves “the deliberate, temporary relaxation of rules in order to explore the possibilities of
alternative rules” (March, 1971: 261). By playing, we do not have to act in a consistent
manner - thus providing an entry to experimentation, irrationality, and foolishness (Ibid.).
Additionally, playing and experimentation facilitates ‘enjoyment’, ‘curiosity’, and
‘discovery’. Important for dynamic search is that playfulness can support what produces the
longing for new aspirations. When the firm’s adaptation under conditions of genuine
uncertainty does not start from some well-defined aspiration, but rather as a longing for
reason and hope; when for the moment-in-being we cannot rely on predefined alternatives
                                                 
8 To March “intelligence is an ex post concept. … [therefore] [o]utcom  intelligence … may be
indeterminate” (Ibid.). This is similar to Shackle’s analysis of choice.
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for choosing, ‘enjoyment in playfulness’ provides an important intellectual and emotional
set-up in acting toward aspiration.
3.2 Creation of disbelief
Dynamic search involves processes of creating disbelief. For Shackle, recall, disbelief
denotes the judgment that a particular fact, state of affairs, or outcome can be brought
about through action which lead to their creation; but those actions are neither concretely
known in their consequences, nor expected to be accomplished without obstacles. Further,
imagined states with a high degree of disbelief yield potentially higher degrees of surprise
than a state which is deemed perfectly possible (and thus, would yield only a little degree of
potential surprise). Creating reasoned disbelieves, thus, must rest on a divergence (of some
sort) between the imagined and what is deemed possible.
Moreover, note that disbelieves, as argued above, have a cognitive as well as emotional
component. Although human thoughts may are hard to measure, [w]hat is measurable in
some sense in connection with thoughts is feeling” (Shackle, 1979:87). “Feeling”, he
continues, “quite evidently has a range of intensities. Then can possibility be linked to
feeling of some sort? The feeling in whose engenderment possiblity-judgments can play a
part of that is surprise. A report from the field, which had been judged impossible, causes an
extreme degree of surprise. No feeling of surprise will be engendered by a report which was
deemed perfectly possible” (Ibid:87-88).
Recall further, that imagination can be directed towards the past and the future.9 When
directed to the past, prior knowledge embodied in the experience and expertise of
individuals and in routines, may through the creation of disbelief be dispensed, rearranged,
bracketed for the moment in being to create space for the novel. Disbelief, may also be
created through selecting and focusing on particular traits of the past, disjoining them from
their relations to other traits, to employ them for the creation of new aspirations. Just as the
people of the Italian Renaissance have tried to resurrect the drama of antique Greece, and
                                                                                                                                         
9 Cf. Shackle (1979:89): "We are prisoners of the present who most choose in the present on the basis of our
present knowledge, judgements , and assessments".
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through the process have created the Opera as a form of arts, so may firms create new
aspirations by isolation, reinterpreting, and utilizing elements of their past to imagine the
future. From this perspective, indeed, ‘unlearning’ is an unclear concept. Furthermore,
coupling disbelief in the determinism of past in conjunction with a feeling of departure fuels
the creation of new aspirations. Directed to the future, creating disbelief involves the
recognition of obstacles to courses of action which are deemed possible in general, but
remain fuzzy in their particular contours. Anticipating obstacles emotionally and cognitively,
sensing their specificities, and acting toward overcoming them in conjunction with a feeling
of longing yields surprise and provides chances to learn, when obstacles turn out to be of
other kind than previously expected.
Importantly, in the process of dynamic search, creating disbelief facilitates surprise and
learning. In particular, since disbelief is also an emotional concept, it is connected to the
dimensions of the agent’s cognitive and perceptual abilities and their possible changes.
Those abilities create the longing which the creation of aspiration-levels requires. Based on
imagination, the decision maker chooses outcomes which yield a certain degree of surprise
when actualized in thought, conversation and imagined experimentation. This process is the
process in which new aspiration levels come about.
3.3 Disengaging limitations of imagination
Imagination is a real-time process (cf. earlier discussion) which makes knowledge constantly
change and thus, our decisions and search will also change and alter as long as it continues.
Although dynamic search will not converge fast to a specific point, it might be reasonable to
argue that it will be bound, or restricted in intensity, once a certain future aspiration
emerges - dynamic search may be saturated when viable aspirations begin to form common
grounds (e.g. new aspirations) which facilitate the coordination of action (cf Mahnke &
Aadne, 1998). In order to reach this point in time, it is important to disengage limitations of
imagination.
Through experimental forming of judgments and though experiments, surprise and
disbelieve are changed. Moreover, the correction to mistaken belief, overcoming failure of
experimental judgment are needed as well. Additionally, the speed with which such
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correction occurs is an important element when overcoming the limitations of imagination.
Human nature, Shackle suggests, dictates that such processes are contantly going on,
through doubt and the state of thought being one of unfinished business. If the decision
maker is to attain a good state of mind, he “must satisfy his practical conscience that he has
examined the question of possibility so far and fully as he can. He must search for obstacles
that need by no means be obvious. He must in thought traverse the route of the imagined
course of affairs and see that it is clear. While such search and examination are in process,
however instantly ready for each turn and contingency of this inspection the prepared mind
may be, the chooser’s state of thought will be that of unfinished business, of doubt,
unreadiness to give judgment. Such a state of thought will not, in the midst of the tide of
affairs, be a merely occasional or exceptional one, but the stuff of the human condition”
(1979:91). It is thus in the active creation of disbelief and doubt that we find the clue to the
continuation of dynamic search; it is through removing the bounds of what is deemed
possible, the speed with which this happens, and the recognition that doubts and
experimentation dispense with what has been thought impossible in the past, that the
creation of new aspiration is supported.
4. Summary
Analyzing the gaps in theories of individual organization and social choice March
comments: “Goals are thrust upon the intelligent man. We ask that he act in the name of
goals. We ask that he keeps his goals consistent. We ask that his actions be oriented to his
goals. We ask that a social system amalgamate individual goals into a collective goal. But
we do not concern ourselves with the origin of goals. Theories of individual organization
and social choice assume actors with pre-existent values” (March, 1971: 256). We could
not agree more with the analysis. That this assumption is not warranted in any case has
increasingly shown by the recent contributions of March (1994) among others. In the case
of genuine uncertainty, where initial aspirations are lacking, and old ones fail to provide
guidance for the firm’s adaptation, to assume initially potent goals is utterly wrong.
The more companies find themselves in situations of genuine uncertainty, the more a more
fully developed theory of dynamic search becomes relevant. Starting from the question
“How do aspiration levels come about in situations of genuine uncertainty?”, we have
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argued in this paper that through dynamic search and associated processes, insights can be
gained into how firms create the conditions for subsequent adaptation and survival. To this
end we have suggested to extend the notion of bounded rationality beyond its received
meaning of bounded computational ability to additionally denote limited imagination (cf.
Kreiner and Augier, 1998; Loasby, 1994) This extended concept of bounded rationality is
central to the concept of dynamic search in that (a) it explicitly makes real-time an issues
and addresses the inherent unknowledgeability of the future, (b) calls for a theory that
addresses the question how aspiration levels come about, and (c) invites to ask how through
the processes of dynamic search old believes are dispensed and/or creatively used to invent
the future. Moreover, we have suggested that three processes can be associated with the
concept of dynamic search, including experimentation and play, creating disbelief, and
disengaging limitations of imagination. Of the three, the first has been discussed by March
(1994) and set in the context of exploration (March, 1991). However, here we are less
concerned with the balance of exploration and exploitation, and more with the question of
how does exploration works in the creation of new aspirations in situations of genuine
uncertainty. That makes necessary the inclusion of the second process, creating disbelief and
surprise, which we adopt from Shackle (1979), but extend it beyond its received use. While
Shackle (1979) has seen disbelief as important in the imagination of the future, here, we
argue that disbelief in the creation of new aspirations is equally useful when directed to the
past. Additionally, at the time being it seems most pressing to further refine exactly what are
the bounds of imagination and how they can be overcome. The following table illustrates
and compares the traditional understanding of search with the concept of dynamic search:
Traditional Theory of Search Dynamic Search
Relevant Situation· Dissatisfaction with
current performance
relative to existing
aspiration
· Uncertainty, Genuine
Uncertainty
Initial Condition· Aspiration levels exist and
are subject to modification
· Initial aspirations do not
exist and are subject to
creation
Aspects of Bounded
Rationality
· Bounded computational
capacity
· Bounded imagination
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Processes· Search induced by
deviations between
existing aspirations
· Search induced by genuine
uncertainty
· Experimentation; Creating
Disbelieves
Relevant Authors· Cyert and March (1963)March (1994); Shackle (1961,
1979); Knight (1921)
5. Conclusion
One of the points in this paper has been the claim that the ideas of George Shackle are
valuable in explaining the role and importance of imagination, the creation of aspiration
levels and hence, in setting out the contours of a theory of dynamic search. It is not
accidental that Shackle has been given central priority in this paper and that another
important input came from James G. March writings on experimentation and play.10 B th
theorists and their subject matters share important characteristics. What they share perhaps
most is that they are rooted in a subjectivist tradition, where emotions, intuition, play, and
imagination are allowed to play a role. Those issues have to some extent be eliminated in
the theories of decision making and the theory of the firm. For example, in rational choice
theory (e.g. Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944), all that is left for the agents to do is to
maximize expected utility. This is seen as the basis of all action and decision making.
Furthermore, although important theories of the firm, for example transaction costs theory
(Williamson, 1975, 1985), have incorporated ‘bounded rationality’ in the form of limited
computational ability, any theory that purports to deal with dynamic adaptation may usefully
incorporate the extended notion of bounded rationality as suggested in this paper.
Approvingly, Williamson (1998) has recently admitted that issues of learning are important
and that transaction cost theory - and we may add most of the other economic theories of
the firm which currently have currency - is remiss in this respect.
As a remedy, moving away from the rigid assumption of rationality and additionally, from
reducing bounded rationality to bounded computational ability, creates space for
considering ‘truly bounded rationality’ (Radner, 1996), where agents may act under
                                                 
10 See Kreiner and Augier (1998) for an elaboration on the similarities between Shackle and March
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conditions of genuine uncertainty, and where stable criteria for maximization cannot exist.
In such a world, boundedly rational agents base their behavior on a number of rules of
thumb and act. Moreover, they not only adapting to given aspirations, but also towards
building new aspirations. Those aspirations are created in a process of active disbelief and in
the process of imagination as suggested in the concept of dynamic search. Such aspirations
cannot be assumed ex-ante and a theory of dynamic search requires to explain its origins.
In particular, we have argued in this paper that the concept of dynamic search provides a
good starting point for a theory of search that explains more fully how aspiration levels
come about in situations of genuine uncertainty. Creating aspiration, in turn, helps
producing a structure, a framework (cf. Loasby, 1994) in which to operate, to recognize
and correct failure, and to facilitate adaptation for and beyond survival. Starting where
Shackle would probably have, we suggested that in this process of creating aspirations we
find dynamic search – search for alternatives not yet known, driven by imagination. When
old ways of looking at the world fail to deliver the aspiration needed to guide the firms
adaptation under genuine uncertainty, dynamic search may provide a first step for dynamic
adaptation. Future research that builds on the concept of dynamic search may more
satisfactorily provide the foundation for a more general process theory of dynamic
adaptation under genuine uncertainty. This clearly is a promising area of future research;
and it contributes to the intellectual venture the behavioural theory of the firm has begun in
1963.
Although the concept of dynamic search is related to the previous literature it goes beyond
its insights, for ‘dynamic search’ begins to answer previously unposed question, including
“How do aspiration levels come about” as opposed to “How do aspiration levels change?”
Indeed, the concept of dynamic search needs further elaboration, however. And as with all
fields of new intellectual ventures the concept rises more questions than it answers.
Specifically relevant for future research are the following two issues and pressing questions:
· How to augment the concept of dynamic search more closely with the complexity of the
market process which constitutes the evolutionary environment within which the firm’s
adaptation takes place? It is obvious that the neoclassical theory of the functioning of
the market is far removed from the concept of dynamic search. This may include a more
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careful consideration of market-process and evolutionary theories (cf. Foss, 1997;
Mahnke et al, 1998).
· How to refine the sub-processes suggested in the concept of dynamic search, in
particular disbelieve and imagination? While some research in this direction is already
under way, both on a foundational (Kreiner and Augier, 1998) and more applied level
(Mahnke and Aadne, 1998) much, much more research is needed before we have
reached theoretical saturation in a process theory of dynamic adaptation.
Today situations of genuine uncertainty become more frequent, and it is time to move
dynamic search and dynamic adaptation under genuine uncertainty from the periphery to the
center, in both, decision making research and the theory of the firm.
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